Independent Air Flight 1851 8 February The aircraft has been destroyed, together with the loss of 144 on board, leading to the
most bizarre plane crash in Portugal’s history.
Independent Air Flight 1851 8 February Aircraft
The aircraft was a 19-year-old Boeing 707 (Serial no. 19572, mill no. 687) which was constructed in 1968, also made its initial trip on 22 March the exact same year.
Independent Air Flight 1851 8 February Aircraft Crew
The flight team Daugherty had 7,766 flying hours, for example 766 hours around the Boeing 707 (278 as primary creation and 488 hours as captain( respectively). He had 2,259 hours to the Boeing
727 (347 hours first officer and 1,912 hours captain( respectively). Adcock needed a Total of 3,764 flying hours, such as 64 hours from the Boeing 707. Gonzalez had
a full of 6,756 flying hours including 1,056 hours to the Boeing 707 He had 2,888 hours to the Boeing 727 and also 2,823 hours around the Lockheed C-5 Galaxy.
Independent Air Flight 1851 8 February Diagnosis
The official throughout that the strategy directions weren’t completely heard because the pilot needed re-keyed his mic to admit the brand new QNH, and probably didn’t hear the
next replicate of this 3,000 feet safe elevation, announcing:”We are re-cleared to 2,000 ft…” (610 m). Even though the initial officer contested the barometric elevation, the captain consented the officer had discovered the read-back properly. After having
Been rid of the ILS system, the team failed to reach that the strategy briefing, overlooking an chance to observe the 3,000 feet minimum safe
altitude along with the existence of Pico Alto. Leveling off at
There was not any proof of any in-flight crisis as well as the
altimeter was discovered properly place to 1027 mb.
Independent Air Flight 1851 8 February Conclusions
The Board of Inquiry concluded that the injury was a result of non-observance from the team of
recognized operating processes which resulted in the intentional descent of their aircraft to 2000 ft if the printed minimum sector altitude was
3000 ft. Additionally, it discovered that the control had placed the aircraft 240 ft (73 m) under that indicated on board the aircraft carrier, exacerbating the
initial mistake by the officer. Other variables:·
communications methods on the section of this co-pilot and control, for example, non-adherence to conventional phraseology in a number of the earth communicating. ·
aerodrome control tower processes rather than asking a readback of their descent
The restricted global flying adventure of the team and the airline conducive crew
training which didn’t consist of emergency maneuvering methods for storm avoidance. ·